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I. INTRODUCTION

Driving west along Route 7 from Leesburg, Virginia, you can exit onto
Route 9, a state-operated highway meandering from Loudoun County, Virginia
toward Charles Tuwn, West Virginia.' A drive along Route 9 will take you on a
winding, two-lane excursion through the countryside where open spaces and
stone walls still dot the landscape and where new homes and vineyards stand as
a testament to recent development and growth. As you drive toward the West
Virginia border, you will pass through the quaint Town of Hillsboro, which celebrated its 200th anniversary in 2002.2 As you leave the Town of Hillsboro, the
terrain becomes hillier and Route 9 becomes even more winding and treacherous. As the journey continues, you will cross from Loudoun County, Virginia,
into Jefferson County, West Virginia.
Beneath the faqade of the beautiful countryside surrounding Route 9 lies
a subtle controversy between the State of West Virginia and the Commonwealth
of Virginia that concerns the future of this road. In short, the controversy arises
from the fact that West Virginia is expanding Route 9 from two-lanes to fourlanes on its side of the border, 3 but Virginia is maintaining Route 9 as a two-lane
road on its side of the border.
This Note argues that the Route 9 controversy is one of the strange incidents of federalism that could best be prevented and resolved by federal legislation that better incentivizes cooperation among interstate governments that are
developing plans for non-federal, transborder highways and roads.4 This Note
discusses whether Virginia's inaction violates the dormant Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution and argues that it may be possible to bring a
cause of action asserting that this inaction is unconstitutional.5 This Note then
I

See UNIVERSAL MAP, ATLAS DELUXE: U.S. & CAN. PLUS MEX. 115 (2008) (providing a map

of Virginia highways).
2
See Eugene Scheel, Hillsboro, Virginia 200 Years Later, 'Town Made of Stone' Retains Its
Idyllic Character, http://www.loudounhistory.org/history/hillsboro.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
3
West Virginia has presumably made this decision in order to provide its citizens with better
access to the booming economy of northern Virginia. See, e.g., Brian Block, Northern Virginia
Regional Economy Spring Forecast Provides Upbeat Outlook on Housing Market,
http://blog.brianblock.com/public/item/162348 (Mar. 16, 2007) (indicating that the Northern
Virginia economy has "outperformed the national economy on all levels" since 1997 due to the
technology boom of 1997-2000 and the increases in government spending from 2000-2005).
4

This proposal is discussed infra in Part IV.

5
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Despite this theoretical possibility, the author believes that it is
highly improbable that the theory would ever find any traction in a court of law. The discussion of
pursuing a legal remedy for this controversy in the courts is made, in part, to demonstrate that this
interstate, intergovernmental problem cannot likely be solved through judicial process, but rather
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goes on to discuss the difficulties that would accompany any attempt to obtain a
judicial remedy under this theory. This discussion is provided for the purpose of
highlighting the inadequacy of the courts in refereeing this controversy and preventing others like it. This Note then concludes with an examination of existing
federal highway funding programs 6 and recommends that the Route 9 issue (and
others like it) would be better solved through passage of legislation that appropriately incentivizes interstate cooperation and highway planning among neighboring states, rather than through a judicial remedy sought under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
H1. A TALE OF Two STATES
Route 9 has historically served as the primary point of entry or departure between Jefferson County, West Virginia and Loudoun County, Virginia
and the Washington, D.C. area. It is the only major east-west corridor providing
access to Jefferson County from Loudoun County. Until recently, Route 9 has
adequately served the rural populations of Loudoun and Jefferson Counties.
However, since 1990, Loudoun County's dramatic population increase 7 and the
resultant congestion along Route 9 has become a serious problem.8 The growth
in neighboring Jefferson County, West Virginia has not been as extensive but it
has been significant. This significant growth has been caused, in large part, by
increased economic prosperity in the region.9 It has also placed an increased
burden on the existing highway infrastructure, which was originally designed

must likely be solved by voluntary cooperation among state governments, direct intervention by
the federal government, or through revision of federal funding legislation. Revising federal funding legislation likely provides the best option because such revision could serve to prevent such a
controversy from occurring elsewhere in the future by incentivizing cooperative planning among
bordering state governments. This possibility is discussed in greater detail in Part IV, infra.
6
A lengthy discussion of the intricacies of this complex area of law is beyond the scope of
this Note.
7
The population of Loudoun County Virginia grew from 86,129 in 1990 to 268,817 in 2006,
which is a population growth increase of approximately 212.1%. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Statistics for Loudoun, County Va., http://www.census.gov/ (enter "Loudoun" under
city/town, county, or zip and select "Virginia" for State and press enter, under the "Population
Finder" search engine) (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
8
On the Virginia side of the border, the Virginia Department of Transportation estimates that
Route 9 serves an estimated average annual daily traffic (AADT) volume of 11,000-21,000 vehicles. See 2005 Virginia Department of Transportation Daily Traffic Volume Estimates Including
Vehicle
Classification
Estimates 9 (2005),
http://www.virginiadot.org/info/resources
/AADT_053_Loudoun_2005.pdf.
9
See, e.g., Stephen S. Fuller, The Northern Virginia Economy: Its Recent Performance and
Outlook (2003), http://www.cra-gmu.org/forecastreports/aNorthern%20Virginia%20Economy.pdf
(indicating the northern Virginia's gross domestic product, population, and total employment
figures have increased more than the rest of the Virginia).
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and constructed to accommodate less traffic. 10 The economic prosperity in
Loudoun County and other parts of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area"
attracts many residents of West Virginia's Eastern Panhandle to the region and
accordingly, much of the increased traffic volume along Route 9 can be attributed to people commuting from their homes in West Virginia to their jobs in
northern Virginia. 12 Regardless of whether West Virginians commuting to
northern Virginia are truly the source of the increased traffic volumes along
Route 9, Route 9's traffic problems are undeniable. In response to these problems, West Virginia and Virginia are responding in two very divergent and conflicting ways.
A.

West Virginia'sResponse - Expansion of Route 9

In 1998, the West Virginia Senate 13 and the West Virginia House of
Delegates' 4 both passed resolutions to upgrade the two-lane Route 9 to fourlanes. Approximately five years after these resolutions passed, the project officially broke ground on April 7, 2003'" and United States Senator Robert C.
Byrd delivered a speech to commemorate the event.' 6 The financial costs associated with the expansion of Route 9 on the West Virginia side of the border are
great. According to the West Virginia Department of Transportation, the expansion of a ten-mile stretch of Route 9 from Martinsburg to Charles Town, West
Virginia is estimated to cost $147 million. 7 The West Virginia Department of
Transportation also estimates that the expansion of Route 9 from Charles Town
to the Virginia border, which includes the construction of a four-lane bridge
10
See 2005 Virginia Department of Transportation Daily Traffic Volume Estimates Including
Vehicle Classification Estimates, supra note 8, at 9.
11 See Fuller, supra note 9.
12 In recent years, various "letters to the editor" and news headlines have served to exemplify
the experiences and prevalence of persons commuting from the Panhandle to northern Virginia.
See, e.g., Margaret Morton, Rt. 9 Groups Draw Lines Over Transportation Plan, LEESBURG
TODAY, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://leesburg2day.comarticles/2007/08/28/news
/loudouncounty/lc 15rtnineO82707.txt
(describing western Loudoun County and West Virginia residents as the major sources of increased traffic volume on Route 9); Bob Harrison, Letter to the Editor, Four Lanes to Disaster,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2001, at A14 (describing the experience of West Virginia residents that use
Route 9 to get to work).
13
See S.R. 14,69TH LEG. (W. Va. 1998).
14
See H.R. 9,69THi LEG. (W. Va. 1998).
15
See Senator Robert C. Byrd, Remarks at Groundbreaking for Route Nine: Challenging Days
Ahead for America (Apr. 7, 2003) (transcript available at http://byrd.senate.gov/speeches
/2003_april/2003_april-list/2003_april-list_2.html).
16
Id.

17 See West Virginia Department of Transportation, WV 9 Status Update: January 2009,
http://www.wvdot.com/projectsWV9/default.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (describing the project associated with the expansion of Route 9 from Martinsburg to Charles Town, WV).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/13
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across the Shenandoah River, will cost approximately $153 million.18 To help
offset the massive construction costs associated with these expansion projects,
West Virginia has received federal funds, secured, in part, through the efforts of
Senator Byrd.' 9
Thus, West Virginia was able to secure funding for the expansion of
Route 9. However, West Virginia's power to expand Route 9 is limited to the
road on the West Virginia side of the border.20 West Virginia clearly has an interest in expanding Route 9 because a total expansion of Route 9 (on the Virginia and West Virginia sides of the border) would better connect the Eastern
Panhandle with northern Virginia and would provide commuters and residents
with more favorable traffic conditions and access to northern Virginia. Even so,
this vision will only be fully realized if Route 9 is expanded on the Virginia side
of the border as well. Therein lies the issue at hand.
B.

Virginia'sResponse - The Controversy and Debates

Whereas West Virginia has a strong interest in making the Eastern Panhandle more accessible for commuters traveling to and from northern Virginia,
Virginia's interest in such an objective is not as strong. This reality is reflected
by the fact that Virginia has not sought to expand Route 9 to a four-lane highway on its side of the border. As pointed out above, Virginia's refusal to act is
problematic because under current conditions, the completed four-lane version
of Route 9 on the West Virginia side of the border will eventually lead to a
winding, two-lane country road on the Virginia side of the border. This would
create numerous bottlenecks and other traffic woes that will be detrimental to
interstate commerce in the region.

18

See id. (describing the project associated with the expansion of Route 9 from Charles Town

to the Virginia State line).
19
See Senator Robert C. Byrd, Remarks at Groundbreaking for Route Nine: Challenging Days
Ahead for America, supra note 15 (stating that $110 million for the project was secured in a 1991
Highway Authorization Bill, $1.04 million was secured through a Transportation Appropriation
and Environmental Studies Bill, and that an additional $10 million was secured for the project
through an appropriations bill in 2002); see also H. Appropriations Committee, 110' Cong., Division K-Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2008, at 2527 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://earmarks.omb.gov/resources
/2008_citationslcitation_426.pdf (providing a report indicating that under Pub. L. No. 110-161,
$8,000,000.00 was earmarked by Senator Byrd to Route 9 in 2008 for "Surface Transportation
Priorities"); Lauren Hough, Byrd urges Senate to OKfunding, THE JOuRNAL, Jul. 21, 2007 (indicating that Senator Byrd has helped to secure "more than $155 million for W.Va. 9 since 1992.").
20
Individual states are not constitutionally permitted to restrict or regulate commerce outside
of the state's territorial boundaries. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). This
legal reality indicates, by extension, that a state would be likewise restricted from building a road
within the territorial boundaries of a neighboring state without the neighboring state's consent.
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In Virginia, many transportation issues for non-major highways are decided at the local level 21 and every county is required to develop a Countywide
Transportation Plan. 22 Under Loudoun County's current Countywide Transportation Plan, it is stated that "Route 9 will be maintained as a two-lane minor
arterial highway in the Rural Policy Area," 23 and it has no official plans to expand Route 9 to four-lanes. Even so, the high volume of traffic along Route 9 in
Virginia has generated concern among Loudoun residents. In fact, some citizens
have advocated various options and proposals to deal with the Route 9 traffic
problems, ranging from maintaining Route 9 as a two-lane scenic by-way, 24 to
expanding Route 9 into a four-lane highway,25 to building a bypass around the
Town of Hillsboro.26
Although numerous possibilities and options have been suggested by
various organizations and individuals for dealing with the Route 9 traffic congestion problems, Loudoun County has no plans to expand Route 9 to fourlanes. 27 In the meantime, Virginia has responded to the traffic problems along
Route 9 by 28
installing a stoplight near the West Virginia border to help control
traffic flow.
While there are various reasons why Loudoun County would want to
maintain Route 9 as a two-lane road, evidence suggests that some Loudoun
21

To facilitate transportation planning at the local level, each Virginia County is required to

draw up a Countywide Transportation Plan, which highlights the County's transportation goals
and needs within its jurisdiction. When a County does not wish to expand a highway and thereby
does not request state funds for infrastructure improvement, as a practical matter, the Commonwealth's Department of Transportation will typically give deference to the locality's preference
for maintaining the state of a given road or highway. Despite the policy favoring deference to
localities, the Commonwealth's state government reserves the right to override local preference
and construct or expand highway infrastructure in opposition to local preference. See VA. CONST.
art. VII, §§ 2, 3 (establishing the supremacy of the Virginia General Assembly in terms of setting
forth the powers and authority of local governmental entities).
22
See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223 (West 2007) (providing the statutory authority and guidelines for the political subdivisions of Virginia to enact and adopt transportation infrastructure
plans).
23
See Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, Countywide Transportation Plan, Ch. 3: County
Road Networks 7 (2001), available at http://www.loudoun.gov/Default.aspx?tabid=1000, (click
"Chapter 3: County Road Networks").
24
See, e.g., Bill Brubaker, Route 9 Bypass Back on The Table; Hillsboro Residents Oppose
Rural Road, WASH. POST, June 10, 2007, at LZTI (quoting longtime Hillsboro area resident, Dot
Shetterly, as being against the construction of a four-lane highway in the Hillsboro area).
25
Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, 2007 Countywide Transportation Plan Draft, D. Corridor 3 - Route 9, 15-16 (May 25, 2007), http://www.loudounctp.con/documents
/May25Draft2007CTP.pdf (recommending that Route 9 be expanded to four-lanes).
26
See Citizens for a Safe Route 9, CS4R9 Positions on a Bypass, http://bypassroute9.org
/positionstatements/positionsonabypass.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
27
See Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, Countywide Transportation Plan, supra note 23.
28 See Michael Laris, Red Light, Green Light: A Tale of 2 States, 1 Road, WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 2002, at T3 (describing Loudoun County's installation of a stoplight on Route 9, near the West
Virginia border) [hereinafter Laris, A Tale of 2 States].
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County residents and even some government officials wish to maintain Route 9
as a two-lane road to keep West Virginia commuters out of Loudoun County, or
to discourage West Virginian commuters from using Route 9 as a means to
access northern Virginia.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VIRGINIA'S REFUSAL TO EXPAND ROUTE 9 ON
THE VIRGINIA SIDE OF THE BORDER

The best way to resolve the Route 9 controversy is not through seeking
recourse in the courts. It is highly doubtful that it could ever be proven that one
State's inaction qualifies as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Even
if such a showing could be made, the courts are ill-equipped to provide a suitable remedy and would likely be reluctant to fashion one because of concerns
over federalism and the separation of powers. However, if an attempt were
made to challenge Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 on its side of the border
in the courts, it would be vital to consider whether Virginia's refusal to expand
Route 9 is constitutional and whether the federal courts are capable of providing
a remedy that provides redress for a possible constitutional violation. To evaluate these concerns, section A analyzes whether Virginia's refusal to expand
Route 9 violates the dormant Commerce Clause; section B analyzes whether the
federal courts can remedy any such constitutional violations.
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 30 The United
States Supreme Court has held that this "commerce power" granted to Congress
is broad, 31 and it is "well-settled" among the federal courts that this power allows Congress to establish and regulate a national system of highways.3 2 Although Congress's power to regulate "interstate" commerce is a broad power,
29

See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 24, at LZO1 (quoting Supervisor James Burton as saying "I

don't see why we have to spend a lot of money and destroy our countryside to satisfy West Virginians."); Michael Laris, Virginias Plot Contrasting Paths; W.Va. Highway Runs Head-On Into
Loudoun Growth Fears, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2001, at Al (quoting Virginia Department of
Transportation Official Kamal Suliman as stating that as opposed to West Virginia's interest in
facilitating access to Loudoun County for West Virginians, "Loudoun County has a different
interest in keeping [West Virginians] out.") [hereinafter Laris, ContrastingPaths].
30
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that "Congress shall have the Power to... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
31
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824) (holding that Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce extends to commercial matters that affect multiple states).
32
See, e.g., Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894) (holding that Congress
has the power "to authorize the construction of a public highway connecting several states.");
Harney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523, 526 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that "lilt is now beyond the
shadow of doubt that aiding the states in the construction of interstate highways is a lawful function of the United States government.").
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the full scope of this power is not always clear because ascertaining the precise
limits of whatever may constitute "interstate commerce" is not an easy task. To
clarify the scope of Congress's commerce power, the United States Supreme
Court held in 1995 that Congress may regulate 1) "the use of the channels of
interstate commerce," 2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities," and 3) "those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce. 33 Thus, in light of Congress's commerce power, it is
clear that Congress has the power to expand Route 9 through specific legislation.34 Despite this power, it is another question altogether whether Virginia's
35
refusal to expand Route 9 violates the "Dormant Commerce Clause" doctrine.
When explicitly noting that Congress has the power to affirmatively regulate interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court once famously
held that the prohibition against the ability of individual states to regulate interstate commerce when Congress has not already acted on the matter is one of the
"great silences of the Constitution." 36 This "great silence" is often referred to as
the dormant Commerce Clause. In analyzing a dormant Commerce Clause issue,
a reviewing court will consider 1) whether a state law facially discriminates
against out-of-staters, 37 2) whether a state law favors in-state interests at the
expense of out-of-state interests, 38 and 3) whether a state law is facially neutral,
but places an undue burden on interstate commerce. 39 The following subsecUnited States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
See Luxton, 153 U.S. at 529.
35
As opposed to Congress's Article I power to regulate interstate commerce, the dormant
Commerce Clause is sometimes invoked by the federal courts to strike down state regulations or
policies that unduly burden or interfere with interstate commerce, even in the absence of Congressional legislation to the contrary. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 575, 585 (1986) (holding that a New York law requiring "every liquor distiller or
producer that sells liquor to wholesalers within the State to sell at a price that is no higher than the
lowest price the distiller charges wholesalers anywhere else in the United States" violated the
dormant Commerce Clause and was therefore unconstitutional).
36
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
37
See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (holding that a law that distinguished between solid waste originating from outside of the state and solid waste originating from
inside of the state was discriminatory on its face and therefore violated the dormant Commerce
Clause).
38
See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (ruling that a Hawaii law that
exempted locally produced liquors from a liquor tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it had the impermissible purpose and effect of discriminating against foreign products in
favor of local products).
39
See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981) (reasoning that a facially neutral Iowa law requiring trucks to be a certain length in order to serve the
State's asserted purpose of enhancing safety, violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it
placed an undue burden on interstate commerce); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.3.1 (3rd ed. 2006) (providing an overview of the dormant
Commerce Clause).
33

34
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tions analyze whether Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 would qualify as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause under any of these categories.
1.

State Laws that Facially Discriminate Against Out-of-Staters

When a state law is facially discriminatory against out-of-staters and
their interests, a reviewing court will almost always render the law invalid. 4°
Examples of such facially discriminatory laws include laws that charge out-ofstate entities higher fees than those charged to in-state entities to dump solid
waste within the state, 4' laws that allow in-state businesses to receive more favorable protection from tax liability than out-of-state businesses,42 and laws that
require in-state processing of goods. 43 A law that is impermissibly discriminatory against out-of-state commerce can take many forms and the cases cited
herein merely illustrate circumstances when the Supreme Court determined that
a state law was facially discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. Thus,
once a reviewing court determines that a law is facially discriminatory against
out-of-state commerce, it will subject the state law to the highest level of scrutiny and will uphold the law only if the discriminatory law serves a "legitimate
local purpose" and only if there are no "nondiscriminatory alternatives" available to achieve that purpose. 44 Because laws that facially discriminate against
interstate commerce are subjected to a form of strict scrutiny, a state arguing for
such a law must demonstrate that its purpose in enacting the law is one other
than "simple economic protectionism. . . ,45 A state arguing in favor of a faSee, e.g., Camps Nfld./Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (holding
that a Maine law granting charitable organizations that primarily served in-state residents more
favorable tax exemptions than those given to charitable organizations that served a clientele consisting primarily of out-of-state residents was a facially discriminatory violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause).
41
See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 114 (1994) (holding
that a law charging depositors of solid waste originating from out-of-state to pay a higher fee to
deposit the waste at a waste disposal site within the state than depositors of waste that originated
from within the State constituted impermissible and invalid discrimination against interstate
commerce); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding that a State law
requiring importers of out-of-state trash to pay a fee to deposit waste at a waste site within the
state, but not requiring depositors of waste that originated from within the State to pay a fee constituted facially impermissible and unconstitutional discrimination against out-of-state commerce).
42
See S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169-71 (1999) (holding that an Alabama law that allowed Alabama corporations to reduce their tax liability by "reducing the par
value of their stock, while [denying] foreign corporations that same ability" was facially discriminatory against out-of-state corporations and was unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause).
43 See Dean's Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding that a city ordinance forbidding milk from being sold within a city's limits that was not processed within five square miles of
the city was facially discriminatory against out-of-state commerce and was therefore invalid).
44
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
45
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
40
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cially discriminatory law must also be able to demonstrate that the law's legitimate purpose cannot be achieved by "nondiscriminatory means."'46
It is unclear whether the Commonwealth of Virginia's refusal to expand
Route 9 could be challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause. Historically,
laws rendered unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, because
they facially discriminated against interstate commerce, involved challenges to
laws enacted by a state legislature47 or municipal lawmaking body. 8 Unlike
prior State policies that were invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause
because they were affirmatively enacted, this issue concerns the burdens placed
on interstate commerce that arise from one state's failure to act 49 in cooperation
with a neighboring state. 0
Because the Route 9 situation involves the Commonwealth of Virginia's
refusal to take action, 5' rather than an affirmatively enacted discriminatory law,
it is highly unlikely that the Commonwealth of Virginia's inaction could be
challenged under the "facially discriminatory" dormant Commerce Clause doctrines. Therefore, the issue must be analyzed under other dormant Commerce
Clause approaches.
2.

State Laws that are Protectionist or Discriminatory in Purpose
or Effect

Often a state law will fall short of being facially discriminatory against
interstate commerce, yet will still run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.
This can occur if a law is enacted with a protectionist purpose 52 or has produced
46

Id.
See, e.g., Camps Nfld./Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (involving
a challenge to a Maine tax law)
48
See, e.g., Dean's Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951) (involving a challenge to a
47

city milk processing ordinance).
49
Unlike prior dormant Commerce Clause cases involving the discriminatory impact of an
affirmatively enacted policy, the burden placed on interstate commerce in the case of Route 9
arises from the Commonwealth of Virginia's inaction. Compare Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1982) (involving a New Jersey law affirmatively prohibiting waste originating from
outside of the state from being imported into it) with Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra
note 23 (stating that "Route 9 will be maintained as a two-lane minor arterial highway in the Rural
Policy Area" and thereby indicating that the Commonwealth of Virginia will not be taking steps
under the current plan to expand Route 9 on Virginia's side of the border).
50
The burden on interstate commerce will arise from the difficulty that will be incurred in
traveling between West Virginia and Virginia as a consequence of having a four-lane highway on
one-side of the border that turns into a two-lane road on the other side of the border.
51
See Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra note 23.
52
See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925) (holding that a Washington state law
requiring common carriers to receive approval from a state bureaucrat in order to conduct operations on the Washington state highways was unconstitutional because the law was motivated by a
protectionist purpose and because it produced a detrimental impact on interstate commerce).
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a protectionist effect.53 State policies alleged to be motivated by a protectionist
purpose or that produce a protectionist effect are not scrutinized under a precise
methodology or calculus. Rather, such policies are analyzed individually ac54
cording to the facts of a given case to find the motivations behind the policy.
Although the Supreme Court has invalidated laws because they were possessed
with a protectionist purpose or created a discriminatory impact on interstate
commerce, 55 the Court has also upheld laws that produce a discriminatory impact on interstate commerce 56 even where adoption of the law was motivated by
a protectionist purpose.57 One leading scholar explains this phenomenon in the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence by stating that the Court will
tolerate laws that discriminate against one group of "out-of-staters," 58 but will
not tolerate laws that discriminatorily
inhibit or prevent all out-of-staters from
59
accessing a "particular state market.,
In the case of Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9, one could argue that
Route 9 is being maintained by Virginia as a "two-lane minor arterial highway ' 60 for the protectionist purpose of excluding or inhibiting West Virginians
from entering Virginia. 6 1 Even so, prevailing under this novel theory would require a challenger to argue that the continued existence of Route 9 as a two-lane
highway on the Virginia side of the border discriminates against interstate
53 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977) (holding that
North Carolina's requirement that apples imported into the state bear a USDA label placed an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce when apples exported from Washington state were
labeled with a stamp that indicated that the apples were subject to standards that met or exceeded
the USDA standards).
54
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, § 5.3.4.
55 See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 354.
56 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-73 (1981) (holding
that Minnesota's requirement that milk be packaged in non-plastic, non-returnable containers was
a valid regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause because the burden the regulation placed
on interstate commerce was found to be slight and insignificant).
57
See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 140 (1978) (holding that a Maryland
law prohibiting producers and refiners of petroleum products from operating retail gas stations
within the State did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, even though the State of Maryland
conceded that it adopted the Statute for the purpose of insulating local dealers and retailers from
the hardships of competing with out-of-state petroleum producers and refiners).
58 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, § 5.3.4.
59 Id.
60
Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra note 23.
61
Although additional evidence would likely need to be gathered in order to demonstrate the
existence of a "protectionist" motive on the part of Virginia in maintaining Route 9 as a two-lane
highway, any endeavor to do so received a good start when a Loudoun County supervisor stated
that he didn't "see why we have to spend a lot of money and destroy our countryside to satisfy
West Virginians." See Bmbaker, supra note 24, at LZ01; see also Laris, ContrastingPaths, supra
note 29 (quoting Virginia Department of Transportation Official Kamal Suliman as stating that as
opposed to West Virginia's interest in facilitating access to Loudoun County for West Virginians,
"Loudoun County has a different interest in keeping [West Virginians] out.").
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commerce by discouraging West Virginians from entering northern Virginia via
the only significant east-west corridor connecting the Eastern Panhandle with
northern Virginia. Successfully prevailing under this theory would also likely
depend on whether a challenger could empirically demonstrate how much interstate commerce is being discriminated against, and whether Virginia's refusal to
expand Route 9 could be shown to be motivated by a protectionist purpose (i.e.
to keep West Virginians out of Virginia).62
In response to these arguments, Virginia would likely argue that the
continued existence of Route 9 as a two-lane highway does not prevent West
Virginians from entering northern Virginia because travelers can also enter
northern Virginia via Route 340.63 Furthermore, Virginia could also likely overcome any charges that its refusal to expand Route 9 was motivated by a protecis based on a lack of
tionist or discriminatory purpose by arguing that its refusal 64
resources to complete such a presumably expensive project.
Thus, making a successful challenge under this theory would require
convincing a reviewing court that the current state of Route 9 as a two-lane
62

See id. Accordingly, it may be necessary to obtain more compelling evidence demonstrating

a protectionist purpose, such as minutes from the Board of Supervisors or official documentation
expressing an official policy goal to achieve such an objective.
63
See AMERiCAN MAP, supra note 1. Route 340 is a north-south highway that originates near
Wayanesboro, Virginia and continues northward, crossing from Clarke County, Virginia into
Jefferson County, West Virginia and extending into Maryland, where it terminates at Route 15 in
Maryland. Id. at 112-13. Virginia may be able to argue that the north-south oriented Route 340
provides a suitable alternative to the east-west oriented Route 9 because although Route 340 is a
two-lane highway from Charles Town, West Virginia to the Virginia State line, it is a four-lane
highway on the Virginia side of the border until it intersects with Route 7 East (and thereby provides indirect east-west access to northern Virginia). See H.B. Elkins, West Virginia U.S. Routes,
http://www.millenniumhwy.net/wvroads/wvusroutes.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing a
brief description of Route 340); On the other hand, although residents of West Virginia's Eastern
Panhandle can access northern Virginia by taking Route 340 south to Route 7 east, this alternative
arguably does not provide sufficient interstate access between the Eastern Panhandle and northern
Virginia because it takes longer to travel between the regions using Route 340 than it would by
using a hypothetical four-lane Route 9 and that this inconvenience places an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Obviously, additional empirical studies would need to be conducted to mete
out how much the existence of Route 9 as a two-lane highway burdens interstate commerce
64
In recent years, Virginia has had difficulty in determining how to properly fund highway
construction and transportation projects. See Amy Gardner & Tim Craig, Va. Transportation
Funding Talks Die, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at AOl (discussing the Virginia General Assembly's failure to agree on budgetary funding for roads in northern Virginia and describing the financial crisis facing the Commonwealth with regards to funding highway construction and maintenance in the region at the time). In response to this difficulty, the General Assembly recently
passed a budget approving a 35% increase in highway construction expenditures, financed
through new revenue and bond programs. See 2007 Va. Acts Ch. 896 originally H.B. No. 3202);
see also Office of the Governor Timothy M. Kaine, Governor Kaine Announces Increased Statewide Transportation Funding, http://www.governor.virginia.gov/MediaRelations/NewsReleases
/viewRelease.cfm?id-410 (last accessed Feb. 13, 2008) (summarizing the implications of the
budgetary funding approved by the General Assembly in H.B. No. 3202 and codified in 2007 Va.
Acts Ch. 896).
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highway on the Virginia side of the border and Virginia's refusal to expand
Route 9 to four-lanes creates a detrimental impact and discriminatory effect on
interstate commerce.65 A challenger's ability to demonstrate that Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 is motivated by a protectionist purpose would bolster
any constitutional challenge brought forth. Making this showing, however, is
not necessary to demonstrate a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because the Supreme Court has previously found that a discriminatory effect,
without more,66can successfully demonstrate a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Overall, proving that Virginia's maintenance of Route 9 as a two-lane
road amounts to interstate commercial discrimination would ultimately turn on a
fact-specific inquiry in the courts. Specifically, this inquiry would turn on
whether any empirical data demonstrates the magnitude of any burdens that
existing policy places on interstate commerce. This data would likely need to
show how many West Virginians are impeded from using Route 9 as a means to
enter northern Virginia and also indicate how the burden on interstate commerce
would be relieved by expanding Route 9 to four-lanes on the Virginia side of the
border.
Even if it could be successfully demonstrated that the continued existence of Route 9 as a two-lane highway on the Virginia side of the border violates the dormant Commerce Clause, it is still questionable whether a reviewing
court has the power to remedy this situation. Another question altogether is
whether such a remedy (if one exists) should be ordered- after all, ordering
such a remedy would essentially require a court to order Virginia to spend its
own money and take proactive measures to expand one of its own highways.
This scenario obviously raises numerous federalism, separation of powers, and
remedial concerns, which will be discussed in detail in Part Il.B.4.
3.

Incidental Burdens on Interstate Commerce and Pike-Balancing

Any suit alleging that Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 to four-lanes
on the Virginia side of the border is a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause would most likely be analyzed under Pike-balancing analysis. 67 Pikebalancing analysis is most often applied when a reviewing court is confronted
with a law that is facially neutral and not facially discriminatory against interstate commerce, but nevertheless places an incidental burden on interstate
commerce. 68 Under Pike-balancing analysis, the reviewing court will weigh the
65

See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (holding that a law that distin-

guished between waste on the basis of its state of origin was discriminatory on its face and therefore unconstitutional).
66
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977).
67
See Pike v. Brace Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)
68
Id. at 142.
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benefits of the state's law against the burdens that those benefits place on interstate commerce. As the Supreme Court in Pike famously held:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.69
Although the "weighing" approach gives a reviewing court the flexibility to
determine whether the equities and benefits of a state's law justify the burden
placed on interstate commerce, the Pike-balancing test has been frequently criticized by some Supreme Court justices as a test that requires the judiciary to
make determinations that are better suited for a legislative body. 70 Despite these
criticisms, the balancing approach is often used to evaluate the constitutionality
of laws and provisions that are deemed to place nondiscriminatory burdens on
interstate commerce.
In the case of Route 9, Pike-balancing analysis would likely be applied
because Virginia's refusal to expand its highway can most realistically be categorized as a policy 71 that places an indirect, nondiscriminatory, and incidental
burden on interstate commerce. Although the two-lane portion of Route 9 on the
Virginia side of the border certainly makes it difficult for West Virginians to
access northern Virginia, since it is the only major east-west corridor in the region, it also makes it difficult for Virginians and Washingtonians to access the
Eastern Panhandle of West Virginia via Route 9, as well. Thus, if the State of
West Virginia, or a private citizen, challenged Virginia's refusal to expand
Route 9 as a policy that violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and the review-

69

70

Id
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619-20

(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Court's usage of balancing tests allows it to
reach different results in different cases that are based on individual and subjective assessments of
policies, which have no basis in the Constitution); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a "balancing" approach is
similar to "judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."); Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 691-92 (1981) (Reqhnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is improper for the Court to determine whether a State's interest in maintaining a law
for the purpose of promoting safety is "outweigh[ed]" by the burden it places on interstate commerce and that it is more proper to determine whether the State's interest in safety is legitimate or
a "mere pretext"). For an article arguing that the Court does not engage in "balancing" at all, but
rather conducts "purpose" inquiries, see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1105-08

(1986).
71
See Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra note 23 (stating that "Route 9 will be maintained as a two-lane minor arterial highway in the Rural Policy Area.").
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ing court applied a Pike-balancing analysis,72 the successful claimant would
likely have to show that Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 places a significant
burden on interstate commerce. If this preliminary showing were made, Virginia
would likely need to demonstrate that its interest in maintaining Route 9 as a
two-lane highway 73 outweighs any incidental burdens placed on interstate commerce by this policy. Lastly, like in the other areas of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence,7 4 it is questionable whether a state's mere refusal to take
action could even be challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause because
all previous challenges made under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
involved challenges to affirmatively enacted legislation.7 5
Challenging Virginia's inaction might be possible, however, because a
reviewing Court, applying Supreme Court precedent, would be concerned with
the impact that Virginia's conduct places on the continued existence of commercial free trade harmony among the states. 76 Preserving harmonious interstate
commerce appears to be the ultimate objective of the dormant Commerce
Clause.77 Therefore, when a state intentionally refuses to take action and this
inaction places a significant burden on interstate commerce, it may be possible
to challenge the inaction as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Even if Virginia's inaction was successfully challenged as a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause, there are still issues to consider regarding the
power of a reviewing court to issue a remedy, and whether such a remedy would
See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (holding that "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
72

relation to the putative local benefits.").
73
These interests could include anything from safety concerns to preservation of the of the
countryside to unavailability of sufficient funds. Regardless of whatever the Commonwealth's
interests in maintaining Route 9 as a two-lane highway may be, if it can be demonstrated that the
Route's continued existence as a two-lane highway places a sufficiently undue burden on interstate commerce and a reviewing court determines that Pike-balancing analysis is applicable, the
Commonwealth will need to convince the reviewing court that its interests (whatever they may be)
outweigh any incidental burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways
Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981) (holding that Iowa's truck length requirement was
unconstitutional and that its asserted interest in safety was outweighed by the incidental burdens it
placed on interstate commerce).
74
See supra Parts M.A. 1, III.A.2.
75
See supra notes 37-48.
76
See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949) (describing the
history of the Commerce Clause's adoption and the willingness of the states to relinquish their
powers of regulation of interstate commerce in order to allow for and promote the existence of
harmonious national trade and interstate commerce); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 523 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that the Courts must strike down attempts by the States to
engage in acts of protectionism because "[t]he Constitution was framed under the dominion of a
political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division.").
77
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
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be proper, in light of federalism and the separation of powers.78 These concerns
will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.4.
B.

Justiciabilityand Remedial Obstacles

Before Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 to four-lanes could be reviewed by a court as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, it would be
necessary for a potential litigant to satisfy threshold standing requirements. If
this burden could be met and a court proceeded to review the merits of the case,
serious remedial, separation of powers and federalism concerns would nonetheless remain. Part Ill.B.1 thus proceeds by considering whether a potential litigant could satisfy threshold standing requirements. Part lI.B.2 considers who
and how a potential litigant could initiate a suit to obtain relief from Virginia's
potentially unconstitutional burdening of interstate commerce, as well as the
available remedies. Part IEI.B.3 will discusses problems and issues that could
arise from an attempt to implement and enforce a structural injunction as a remedy. Lastly, Part ImB.4 analyzes whether concerns for federalism and the separation of powers values might preclude a reviewing court from ordering a remedy.
1.

The Issue of Standing

As mentioned above, before a potential litigant could ever argue that
Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 violates the dormant Commerce Clause,
the litigant would need to satisfy standing requirements. The Supreme Court has
held that the United States Constitution requires all suits litigated in a federal
court to satisfy the standing requirements of "[1)] 'injury in fact'-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, . . . and
(b) 'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or 'hypothetical,' ".... [2)] a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
be 'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and v.-t...
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the co6u:-. '
[and that 3)] it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the
injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision., 79 Beyond the constitutional
requirements for standing lie various "prudential" court-imposed standing requirements that determine whether it is proper for a court to expend judicial
resources in deciding a matter.8 0 Prudential standing requirements bar a plaintiff
from bringing suit when 1) the plaintiff is seeking to invoke the rights or inter78

See SEPARATION

OF POWERS

LAW: CASES

AND MATERIALS

26-36 (2nd ed. 2005) (providing

an overview of the constitutional roles, separation and overlapping powers of Congress, the Executive and the Judiciary in the United States); see generally Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A
Foreword,86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977) (providing an in-depth discussion of American federalism).
79
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
80
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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ests of a third party, 8 ' or 2) the plaintiff is bringing a generalized grievance, 82 or
3) the claim is "outside of the zone of interest" that a statutory, or even perhaps
a constitutional, right is intended to protect. 83 A challenge to standing can prevent a case from being decided on the merits. However, allegations satisfying
standing requirements will generally be sufficient unless the suit is confronted
with a Rule 56(e) motion, at which point the allegations must be supported by
"specific facts." 84
a.

Constitutional Standing Requirements

In this case, it should be possible for a potential litigant to satisfy the
first constitutionally required standing requirement of "injury in fact. '8 5 However, the litigant would likely need to demonstrate how and why the continued
existence of Route 9 as a two-lane highway on the Virginia side of the border
8
burdens interstate commerce. 86 Assuming this showing could be made,87
the
litigant would then need to demonstrate that the asserted burden on interstate
commerce is "fairly traceable" to Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9.88 Lastly,
the plaintiff would need to satisfy the "redressability" requirement 9 -that is,
the plaintiff must show that a successful result will resolve the harm. In addition
to proving "injury in fact," the redressability standing requirement may prove to
be the most difficult standing hurdle for a potential litigant to clear. This is be81

See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (holding that a physician lacked standing to

obtain an adjudication upon a matter that affected his patients' rights because the adjudication
would not affect any interest that directly implicated or infringed upon the rights or property of the
physician, but instead would clarify the rights of his patients).
82
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974) (holding that "standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is
held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the
injury all citizens share."); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922) (holding that citizens
do not have a generalized right to litigate whether a constitutional amendment or statute, if
adopted, would be valid).
83
See Assoc. of Data Processing Svc. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) (holding
that the courts may consider, as a prudential standing requirement, whether a relevant statute is
intended to protect the interest that a plaintiff alleges is not being served as a consequence of a
given act, or a failure to act).
84
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
85
See id. at 560-61.
86
See supra Part II.A.
87
As discussed in Part IH.A, this could be a very difficult showing for a plaintiff to make.
Common sense and practical experience shows that rates of interstate and global commerce increase alongside improvements in trade avenues. Despite this commonsense notion, proving just
how much interstate commerce is burdened and impacted by the continued maintenance of Route
9 as a two-lane highway on the Virginia side of the border could prove to be an onerous task indeed.
88
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
89
See id. at 568.
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cause even if a potential litigant successfully demonstrated that Virginia's failure to extend Route 9 unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce, it is unclear whether a court would be willing or able to issue an injunction ordering
Virginia to expand Route 9 on its side of the border, or to take other remedial
action.90
In sum, constitutional standing requirements may prevent a plaintiff
from challenging Virginia's inaction on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.
Furthermore, as outlined above, even if the constitutionally mandated standing
requirements could be satisfied, it will also be necessary for a potential litigant
to satisfy the Supreme Court's "prudential standing requirements." Thus, even
granting that a provable injury caused by Virginia's inaction could be established, a reviewing court might still be unable or unwilling to redress the harm.
b.

Prudential Standing Requirements

The Supreme Court has self-imposed "prudential standing" doctrines on
the federal courts for the purpose of ensuring judicial efficiency and for the sake
of pragmatism. 91 These standing requirements are not constitutionally mandated,
but if a federal court believes that a case offends a prudential standing requirement, it will decline to assert jurisdiction.
One prudential standing requirement is described as the prohibition
against "generalized grievances." With regard to this standing requirement, the
courts generally prohibit plaintiffs from litigating generalized matters that affect
everyone, such as challenging a member of Congress's continued membership
in the armed services as an alleged contravention of the Constitution.9 2 The "generalized grievance" prudential standing requirement is grounded in a concern
that certain matters are better resolved by the executive and legislative branches
of government. 93 A reviewing court may likewise hold that a challenge to Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 qualifies as a generalized grievance and is
better resolved by the political branches of government. 94 However, this may
These concerns and obstacles are analyzed in greater detail in Part 1T.B.3. below. See infra
Part IH.B.3.
91
See Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (holding that prudential standing is constituted of "several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and
the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.").
92
See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220.
90

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (holding that the prudential standing doctrine can help the courts avoid
awkward intrusions into matters that are "most appropriately addressed in the representative
branches.").
94
It should be noted that there is some overlap between the "political question doctrine" and
the prudential standing requirement prohibiting a litigant from asserting generalized grievances.
93
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not be the case if the litigant can demonstrate that he has suffered particularized
harm as a consequence of the continued existence of Route 9 as a two-lane
highway.
2.

Who is a Proper Plaintiff and What is a Viable Remedy?

Assuming that Virginia's inaction qualifies as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, it would be necessary to determine how a cause of
action could be brought and also who or what could bring it. This question is
important because a cause of action alleging that Virginia's refusal to expand
immunity, 95
Route 9 is unconstitutional implicates matters of state sovereign
96
which protects states from suits that it has not consented to.
a.

Suit by Private Citizen

If a private citizen or citizens were to bring a suit seeking redress for
Virginia's unconstitutional refusal to expand Route 9, the citizen could file a
section 2201 action 97 to obtain declaratory relief clarifying whether Virginia's
refusal to expand Route 9 violates the United States Constitution. If a court then
determined 98 that Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 indeed violated the Constitution, the litigant could then file a section 2202 action99 to obtain redress for
the violation. This would likely entail suing a government official of Virginia in
his or her official capacity 1°° for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young. 1° 1
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that a nonjusticiable political question
can arise when there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department"). The overlap exists in that "both of them depend in part on the
alternative means by which a party may adjudicate" the controversy in question. Daniel P. Tokaji,
Commentary, The Justiciabilityof Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, 107
MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 31, 36 (2008), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org
/firstimpressions/voll07/tokaji.pdf (discussing the differences between the political question doctrine and the prudential standing doctrine prohibiting litigants from asserting generalized grievances).
95
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stating in whole that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.").
96
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding that as a matter of
state sovereignty and in the absence of a valid congressional abrogation of its sovereign immunity,
a state may not be sued by individuals without its consent).
97
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
98

Id.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2202.
An example of a government official that might be sued for injunctive relief in this instance
might be the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Transportation. See Va. Department of
Transportation, Transportation Commissioner, http://www.virginiadot.org/about/ekem.asp (last
accessed Feb. 13, 2008) (indicating that David S. Ekern is the current Transportation Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Transportation).
99

100
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Despite sovereign immunity strictures, the Supreme Court permits aggrieved individuals to obtain prospective relief against a state official to stop or
prevent the unconstitutional or unlawful enforcement of a federal law. 0 2 In Ex
parte Young, 10 3 the Supreme Court held that it was proper to enjoin the Attorney
General of Minnesota from enforcing unconstitutional laws.' 4 This holding was
significant because it clarified that private citizens can obtain relief from a
state's unconstitutional conduct by enjoining a government official from that
state, in his or her official capacity, to comply with the United States Constitution.' 0 5 Thus, in the case of a private citizen seeking redress against Virginia for
its refusal to expand Route 9, it may be possible for that citizen to enjoin a government official to expand Route 9 and thereby alleviate the burden that Virginia's refusal to expand the road poses. 10 6 Obtaining such an extraordinary
remedy with such dramatic implications and consequences, however, would
obviously raise serious questions concerning federalism and the separation of
powers.1°7
b.

Suit by West Virginia

While it may be possible for a private citizen to bring a suit, it may also
be possible for the State of West Virginia itself to seek redress. This is because
the United States Constitution vests the United States Supreme Court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between States 0 8 and because
the Eleventh Amendment gives states sovereign immunity against suits brought

101 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908) (holding that "individuals who, as officers of the state, are clothed

with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties
affected by an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action."); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 438
(2004) (holding that a court may enforce a consent decree entered into between a private citizen
and a state as part of a settlement agreement with the citizen for the citizen's suit against one of
the state's government officials in his or her official capacity and holding further that enforcement
of the consent decree does not violate the Eleventh Amendment).
102 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (limiting the relief available under the Ex parte Young doctrine to "prospective injunctive relief).
103 Id. at 148.
104 Id. at 156.
105

Id.

106

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

107 These questions are discussed in greater detail below in Part

mI.B.4.

108 See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2 (granting the United States Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) ("The
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or
more States.").
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by citizens. 109 Accordingly, it may be possible for West Virginia to sue Virginia
directly to obtain relief from any constitutional violations that Virginia may be
committing by its refusal to expand Route 9.110 The limitations and procedural
requirements imposed on a private citizen 1 I would not be present if West Virginia sued Virginia directly.
c.

The Remedy Preferred: Injunction

Given the possibility that Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 could be
challenged by a private citizen seeking the enjoinment of a Virginia government
official,"12 or by the State of West Virginia suing the Commonwealth of Virginia
directly,1 3 it is next important to determine the most appropriate remedy. Redress, if available, would likely take the form of an injunction ordering the
Commonwealth of Virginia,' 14 or a Virginia governmental official" 15 to take
steps to expand Route 9 to four-lanes on its side of the border because doing so
would likely eliminate or reduce the burdens placed on interstate commerce and
travel via Virginia's current refusal to expand Route 9.116
Although it might be possible for West Virginia to sue Virginia for
monetary damages so West Virginia could continue the expansion of Route 9 on

109

See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stating in whole that "[tlhe Judicial power of the United States

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.").
110
If the State of West Virginia chooses to bring a cause of action against the Commonwealth
of Virginia for its refusal to expand Route 9, it would not be the first time that these two states
were parties to adverse litigation with one another. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S.
565, 589 (1918) (involving a suit by Virginia to recover amounts owed by West Virginia for West
Virginia's portion of the antebellum debt assumed prior to the division of West Virginia and Virginia and as agreed upon by contract signed between the two sovereigns and as approved by Congress).
'I
See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908).
112

Id.

13

See U.S. CONST. art.

114

m, § 2.
The Commonwealth of Virginia itself might be ordered to comply with an injunction if the

State of West Virginia were a successful litigant.
15
If a private individual or individuals brought suit, a Virginia governmental official, rather
than the Commonwealth of Virginia itself, might be ordered to comply with a prospective injunctive order. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
116
See Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra note 23. As an alternative to expanding
Route 9 to four lanes on its side of the border, Virginia might be permitted to agree upon some
other suitable alternative that sufficiently reduced any incidental burdens placed on interstate
commerce, such as the construction of an entirely new highway providing access to the east-west
corridor between northern Virginia and the Eastern Panhandle of West Virginia that would connect with Route 9 on the West Virginia side of the border.
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the Virginia side of the border, 1 7 practical realities dictate that this option would
not be feasible." 8 Furthermore, private citizens usually cannot sue a state for
19 and usually resort to injunctive relief via
damages for constitutional violations
0
the Ex parte Young doctrine.12
3.

Implementation and Enforcement of Injunctive Relief

As stated, a litigant bringing a cause of action against Virginia' 2' for the
incidental burden its refusal to expand Route 9 places on interstate commerce,
would likely seek injunctive relief. 22 With that said, seeking injunctive relief in
this case presents many remedial issues, including, but not limited to, enforcement of the injunction and the precise form of the injunctive relief itself. For
example, assume that a litigant successfully argues that Virginia's refusal to
expand Route 9 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 123 A reviewing court
reaching this conclusion will then be confronted with the possibility of ordering
injunctive relief that requires Virginia to eliminate the unconstitutionality of its
continued inaction. The court would have to order Virginia to expend its own
resources to comply with the court order. This strange possibility and the potential difficulties associated with it are considered below.
a.

Implementing the Injunctive Order

Although it may seem counterintuitive for a court to order a state to
spend its own resources, such orders have previously been issued and enforced.
Such extraordinary orders appeared within the context of courts providing re24
dress for constitutional or statutory violations involving school integration,
117
Proceeding this way, West Virginia would need to carry out the expansion of Route 9 on the
Virginia side of the border in essentially the same way that a private actor would, given that West
Virginia obviously has no sovereignty over the Commonwealth of Virginia.
118 For example, West Virginia might be able to build a four-lane highway in Virginia, but this

would require West Virginia to purchase property from property owners in the region along Route
9 and receive approval from Virginia for the highway project (in the absence of a Court order).
Thus, it is likely that if a remedy is sought and obtained by West Virginia, it will not take the form
of monetary damages and would, in all likelihood, take the form of an injunction.
119
See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-70, 94 (1974) (holding that whereas a private citizen may be able to obtain injunctive relief against a state official, it is not likewise permissible for a private citizen to sue a state for monetary damages, which is prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment).
120 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908).
121 As noted, a potential litigant could be either a private citizen or the State of West Virginia.
See supra Part IH.B.2.a-b.
122 See supra Part II.B.2.c.
123
See supra Parts III.A. 1-3.
124
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971) (upholding
district and circuit court orders requiring the integration of the public schools in a school district,
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prisoner civil rights, 125 and public health systems. 126 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a "court order directing a local government body ' to
27
levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court.,

In light of these precedents, it is safe to say that a reviewing federal court possesses the inherent equitable power to order injunctive relief requiring the
Commonwealth of Virginia to expand Route 9, or at least to require the Commonwealth to provide a suitable alternative.
If a reviewing court were to order injunctive relief in the case of
Route 9, it would likely first order the Commonwealth of Virginia to expand
Route 9128 and leave the precise implementation of this mandate to the discretion of Virginia. 29 The reviewing court would likely give Virginia a window of
time to comply. 30 However, if Virginia failed to comply with the order by the
deadline, the court might then order a detailed structural injunction13 ' with specific requirements and guidelines, in order to ensure compliance with the court's
order. 132 These specific requirements might include highway plans, financial
plans, or the appointment of a special receiver to carry out the reviewing court's
order. 133 However specific a reviewing court's injunctive order may be, the costs

which required, in part, mandatory busing of students in order to properly effectuate racial integration of the schools).
125 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F.Supp. 140, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ordering the New
York City Department of Corrections to comply with constitutionally required housing minimums
for prisoners and ordering the Department to provide prisoners with specified amounts of compensation for any failures the Department may have complying with the order).
126
See, e.g., Dixon v. Barry, 967 F.Supp. 535, 553 (D.D.C. 1997) (ordering a special receiver
to implement the standards mandated by the court's 1976 order, after the District of Columbia
failed to comply with this order).
127
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990).
128
Building a new highway parallel to Route 9 and connecting with the expanded Route 9 in
West Virginia would likely qualify as a suitable alternative.
129
Dixon, 967 F.Supp. at 537 (noting that the case had been pending for over twenty years and
was there before the court because the District of Columbia had failed to comply with the district
court's order issued in 1974).
130

See id.

Professor Owen M. Fiss is credited with coining the term "structural injunction," which is a
form of injunction used by a court to assert control over an improperly or insufficiently functioning social institution, such as an educational or correctional system. See OwEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL
RlGHrs INJUNCTION 8 (1978).
132
See Dixon, 967 F.Supp. at 555 (ordering a special receiver to "oversee, supervise, and direct
131

all financial, contractual, legal, administrative, and personnel functions of the CMHS, and to
restructure the CMHS into an organization that is oriented toward advancing the objectives" outlined in the district court's previous order to comply with statutory requirements after finding that
the dire circumstances arising from the District of Columbia's failure to comply with the district
court's earlier orders warranted the appointment of the special receiver with such broad powers).
133
Id.
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involved in ordering Virginia to expand Route 9134 might present the court with
enforcement problems because the costs of implementation might lead Virginia
to "drag its feet" with compliance.
b.

Enforcement

If a court were to issue an injunction in the Route 9 case, enforcement
of the injunction would likely prove to be tricky and difficult. This is because
when courts are confronted with the difficult task of ordering a state to meet
certain mandates, which thereby require a state to expend its own resources,135 a
variety of enforcement difficulties can arise, 136 such as the court becoming entwined with a state bureaucracy in order to ensure compliance. Furthermore, to
enforce compliance with a court order, the courts will typically levy fines 137 or
hold non-complying government officials in contempt. 138 The use of contempt
against individuals as a judicial device for resolving noncompliance with a court
order is resorted to only after other options have been used and found to be ineffective. 139 Thus, if a reviewing court ordered the Commonwealth of Virginia to
For a comparative example illustrating the likely enormous costs that would be associated
with expanding Route 9 on Virginia's side of the border, the West Virginia department of transportation estimates that the expansion of Route 9 along a ten mile stretch of highway from Martinsburg to Charles Town, West Virginia will cost approximately $147 million. See supra note 17.
135
See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.1966), afftd,
134

380 F.2d 385, 390 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (issuing an order elaborately detailing mandates and instructions that a school district was required to follow in order to avoid offending the constitution
on equal protection and due process grounds).
136
See, e.g., Benjamin v. Sielaff 752 F.Supp. 140, 142-46 (S.D.N.Y.,1990) (detailing the New
York City Department of Corrections' difficulty in complying with an earlier court order); see
also REMEDIES CASES AND MATERIALS 368 (Doug Rendleman ed., West 7th ed. 2006) (1967)
(noting that enforcement difficulties can produce responses including claims of a "[d]efendants'
bureaucratic inertia, pleas for more time, and cries of poverty" and can also present "resort to the
defense of inability to comply.").
137
See, e.g., Sielaff, 752 F.Supp. at 14849 (ordering the New York City Department of Correction to comply with constitutionally required housing minimums for prisoners and ordering the
Department to provide prisoners with specified amounts of compensation for any failures the
Department may have when complying with the order).
138
See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding
the district court's holding of individual members of a city council in contempt for failing to respond or comply with earlier court orders mandating that the city comply with federal housing
laws (citing Title VII1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982)), rev'd,
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 267 (1990).
139
For example, when reversing the Second Circuit's holding in United States v. City of Yonkers in Spallone v. United States, the United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that
the District Court, in view of the "extraordinary" nature of the imposition of
sanctions against the individual councilmembers, should have proceeded with
such contempt sanctions first against the city alone in order to secure compliance with the remedial order. Only if that approach failed to produce compli-
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expand Route 9 and the Commonwealth failed to comply with the order, the
reviewing court would likely issue general fines against the Commonwealth or
hold individual Virginia government officials in contempt as a last resort. 140
4.

Federalism and Separation of Powers Concerns

Although it would be possible for a reviewing court to grant injunctive
relief against the Commonwealth of Virginia in this instance, t4 a reviewing
court may be reluctant to do so in light of concerns for federalism and the separation of powers. 142 Federalism is a concept, thought to be derived from the
structure of the United States Constitution itself,143 which calls for a division of
power between the federal and state governments. The separation of powers is a
concept that describes the division and balance of power among and between
the three coordinate branches of the federal goverment.'44
In light of federalism concerns, many jurists have long argued that some
issues should not be officiated by the federal courts and must be dealt with only
by the individual states as an incident of state sovereignty. 4' Given that Route 9
ance within a reasonable time should the question of imposing contempt sanctions against petitioners even have been considered.
493 U.S. at 280.
140

Id.

See supra Part III.B.3.
142 For a scholarly discussion expanding upon the concepts of federalism and separation of
powers concerns raised by the usage of broad structural remedies by the federal courts see John
Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1121 (1996).
143
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (Black, J.) (stating that the term federalism describes "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that
this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a
highly important place in our Nation's history and its future."); see also Patrick M. Gary, The
Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of
Powers, 57 ALA. L. REv. 689, 691 n.13 (quoting LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES:
A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONsTrrtmONAL PRACTICE 154-55 (2004)); Friendly, supra note 78
(discussing the nature of "federalism").
144
The three branches of the federal government being the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government. See SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW, supra note 78, at 23-33 (discussing
the constitutionally designed separation and overlapping of powers amongst the three primary
branches of government).
145
See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Supreme Court's invalidation of a punitive damage award was improper because it
constituted "an unjustified incursion into the province of state governments."); United States Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a]s far
as the Federal Constitution is concerned, then, the States can exercise all powers that the Constitution does not withhold from them.").
141
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is a non-federal highway on both sides of the border, a reviewing court may
very well, and should, determine that Route 9's non-federal status renders its
disposition purely a state matter. The court should find that Virginia has full
authority, as an incident of its sovereignty, to maintain or expand the road's
capacity. With regard to separation of powers concerns, the courts will sometimes argue that a matter is nonjusticiable because it should be addressed and
resolved by the political branches of government.146
For example, in Lewis v. Casey,147 concerns over the separation of powers and federalism appeared when the United States Supreme Court overturned a
broad structural injunction issued by the District of Arizona.14 In Lewis, the
Supreme Court held that it was improper for the district court judge to issue a
broad injunction requiring the Arizona Department of Corrections to update and
improve its law library because the political branches of the federal government
the precise poliand the states, rather than the federal judiciary, should develop
149
cies and means necessary to avoid future offenses to the law.
Thus, in light of the principles of federalism and the separation of powers, a reviewing court may determine that it would not be proper to order Virginia to expand Route 9. Furthermore, this matter should be resolved by Congress or by the individual states. It is unfortunate that Route 9 will likely exist as
a four-lane highway on one side of the border and as a two-lane country road on
the other for the foreseeable future, but perhaps this result should be accepted as
one of the peculiar consequences of federalism. "0

14 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131-32 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that
"[flederal courts do not possess the capabilities of state and local governments in addressing difficult educational problems. State and local school officials not only bear the responsibility for
educational decisions, they also are better equipped than a single federal judge to make the day-today policy, curricular, and funding choices necessary to bring a school district into compliance
with the Constitution."); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (holding that "[a] controversy is nonjusticiable- i.e., involves a political question- where there is 'a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it .... ' (quoting Baker v. Carr,
Of Guns, Abortions and the Unrav369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); see also J. Harvey Wilkinson, III,
(2009) (forthcoming), available at
eling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REv. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm?abstractjid=1265118 (arguing that some matters are best
resolved by the political branches of government and that the courts are ill-suited for determining
certain complex policy matters).
147 518 U.S. at 349-50.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 In other words, the Route 9 phenomenon (and others like it) can arise when a non-federal

interstate highway is maintained by one state on one side of the border and by another state on the
other side of the border and when each state has contrasting policy interests and goals for the
future of the highway on its own side of the border.
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IV. FEDERAL MECHANISMS FOR FINANCING AND CONSTRUCTING INTERSTATE
ROADS WITH FEDERAL FUNDS

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that although it may be possible to
resolve the Route 9 controversy through judicial redress, it is also clear that any
litigant attempting this will be plagued with uncertainty and will be faced with
the onerous tasks of 1) proving that Virginia's inaction is unconstitutional' 51 and
2) overcoming numerous remedial obstacles.' 52 Given the obstacles inherent in
any attempt to resolve the Route 9 controversy through judicial redress, it is
important to alternatively analyze how the controversy could be resolved
through the political process. Accordingly, this Part will analyze the relevant
federal highway statutes and will seek to determine whether the Route 9 controversy could be resolved by an act of Congress or through existing statutory mechanisms.
To begin, it is undisputed that the "Commerce Clause" of the United
States Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
among the States. 153 This grant of power is typically referred to as Congress's
"Commerce Power," and from it the courts have uniformly held that Congress
has the power to establish and regulate a national system of highways,154 and to
financially assist states with the construction and maintenance of state highways. 55
Congress began its most significant foray into the establishment of a
modern interstate highway system when it enacted the Interstate Highway Act
156
of 1956, which was subsequently signed into law by President Eisenhower.
Under this Act, Congress authorized "the building of a forty-one-thousand-mile
system of expressways,"'' 5 7 which laid the foundation for the interstate highway
system that exists today. Since 1956, an elaborate series of congressional legis-

151

See supra Part III.A (discussing the constitutionality of Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9

on its side of the border).
152
See supra Part III.B (discussing the remedial difficulties that would confront a litigant able
to successfully demonstrate that Virginia's refusal to expand Route 9 is unconstitutional).
153
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that "Congress shall have the Power to... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
154 See, e.g., California v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1888) (holding that the commerce power grants Congress the power to construct or authorize the construction of a national
system of highways and that this power is "essential to the complete control and regulation of
interstate commerce.").
155 See Haney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523, 526 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that "[i]t
is now
beyond the shadow of doubt that aiding the states in the construction of interstate highways is a
lawful function of the United States government.").
156
See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,70 Stat. 374 (1956).
157 PAUL S. BOYER Er AL., THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 931

(3d. ed. 1996).
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lation has addressed the distribution of federal funds for highway projects.' 5 A
summary and description of the primary methods of distributing federal highway funds is provided to illustrate how the Route 9 issue could be solved
through reforming the existing highway funding laws.
A.

AuthorizationActs

Highway projects financed with federal funds under the Federal-Aid
Highway Program 159 primarily receive funding through authorization acts
passed by Congress.' 6 These acts finance a variety of programs, but most often
guide how funds should be distributed by providing "ceilings," or maximum
amounts of federal money available for highways and other transportation programs. 161 They can also set spending minimums for various programs. 162 These
authorization acts typically allocate certain levels of funds for a limited duration,163 and special legislation can be passed to extend their durations for varying periods of time. 164 Many of these acts are not formally codified, but many
158 See, e.g., Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178 (authorizing
federal funding for highways, transit and highway safety programs from 1998-2003).
159 The Federal-Aid Highway Program is "really an umbrella term for all the highway programs
administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)." Robert S. Kirk, CRS Report for
Congress, Federal-Aid Highway Program: "Donor-Donee" State Issues (2004), available at
http://www.royce.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RL31735.pdf. The Federal Aid Highway Program
traces its origins to 1916 when Congress first approved distributing federal funds to construct
highways under the Federal-Aid Road Act. See 39 Stat. 355 (1916). Since those early days, the
Federal-Aid Highway Program has been greatly expanded and is administered by the Federal
Highway Administration (an agency of the United States Department of Transportation). See
Federal Highway Administration, Who We Are and What We Do, http://www.flwa
.dot.gov/whoweare/whoweare.htm (last visited Mar 1, 2009). Many of the laws governing the
administration of the Federal-Aid Highway Program are codified in Title 23 of the U.S. Code.
See 23 U.S.C. § 101 et al. (2006).
160 See generally Office of Legislative and Governmental Affairs, Financing Federal Aid
Highways: Authorization Act, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/financingfederalaid/authact.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (providing an overview of the congressional appropriations process, as
well as descriptions of other methods used by Congress to establish budgetary distribution of
federal funds).
161

Id.

162 See Federal Highway Administration, A Summary of Highway Provisions in SAFETEALU, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/safetea-lu.doc (2005) (stating that SAFETEA-LU "continues the TEA-21 concept of guaranteed funding, keyed to Highway Trust Fund (Highway Account) receipts. In essence, the guaranteed amount is a floor- it defines the least amount of the
authorizations that may be spent.").
163 For example, Congress enacted the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century in 1998
for the purpose of allocating funds to be used for the construction of highways and other transportation programs, but the Act had a limited duration and was written to sunset in 2003. See Pub. L.
No. 105-178 (1998), available at http://www.thwa.dot.gov/tea2l/sumtoc.htm (providing the full
text of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century).
164 See Office of Legislative and Governmental Affairs, supra note 160.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/13

28

20091

Clark: Burden of Inaction:
How Two
States
Set Different Paths for One No
THE BURDEN
OF
I&ACTION

provisions relating to fund distribution under the Federal Aid Highway Program
are codified in Title 23 of the United States Code. 165 For example, one of the
most significant and recent highway authorization acts is the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (herein
"SAFETEA-LU").' 66 The SAFETEA-LU 167 provides $244.1 billion for highway
infrastructure construction, improvement, and maintenance 68 and will sunset in
2010169 unless it is reauthorized by Congress.
B.

AppropriationsMeasures

The second major way Congress funds highway construction projects is
through congressional appropriations measures. 70 Whereas authorization acts
"establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs... [a]ppropriations measures provide new budget authority for the program, activity, or agency previously authorized" by an authorization act.1 71 In other words, appropriation
measures bolster or buffer a program that already has baseline funding through
an authorization act, such as the SAFETEA-LU. 172 Congress finances many
transportation projects in this way. 173

165

See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing guidelines for "[piroject approval and over-

sight").
166
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-203 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin
/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_congjreports&docid=f:hr203.109.pdf (providing the full text of the
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users).
167
See Federal Highway Administration, SAFETEA-LU, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu
/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (providing numerous links to references and resources
concerning the SAFETEA-LU).
168
See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 162, at 2 (providing an overview of the
budgetary implications of the SAFETEA-LU).
169 See id.
170 Under current law, Congress directs that an appropriation of funds under SAFETEA-LU is
not to infringe upon the State's sovereign power "to determine which projects shall be federally
financed." 23 U.S.C.A. § 145 (2009).
171
Sandy Streeter, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction,
http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/appfacts.pdf
30 (2006) (describing the primary differences between authorization acts and appropriations
measures).
172
See The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users, H.R. Rep. No. 109-203 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_congjreports&docid=f:hr203.109.pdf (exemplifying a recent highway authorization act).
173
See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-69, 113 Stat. 986 (2000) (allocating appropriations to various agencies, including the Federal
Highway Administration and setting allocation rates for the Highway Trust Fund for, the purpose
of funding the Federal-Aid Highway system).
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The Highway Trust Fund

In 1956, the same year that Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway
Act, it also passed the Highway Revenue Act, 175 which established the Highway Trust Fund.1 76 The Highway Trust Fund was established for the purpose of
directing tax revenues from specific sources to go toward the construction of a
federal highway system. 77 The Highway Trust Fund is funded by taxes levied
on the sale of gasoline, 178 specialized fuels, tires, trailers, trucks, and heavy vehicles. 79 The fuel taxes are typically paid by the refiners or importers, and the
tire taxes are typically paid for by the tire manufacturers. 80 Under this scheme,
some states inevitably pay more into the Highway Trust Fund than others. Consequently, a state can receive less federal funding for its highways than the state
pays into the Highway Trust Fund. Likewise, another state can receive more
federal funding from the Highway Trust Fund than it has contributed. 1 8' States
contributing more to the Highway Trust Fund than they receive are often referred to as "donor" states and states receiving more from the Highway Trust
Fund than they contribute are often referred to as "donee" states. 8 2 To rectify
the problem of disproportionality and to enhance the equitability of distribution
under the Highway Trust Fund, Congress established a minimum guaranteed
contribution return rate183 with the passage of the now-expired Transportation
174

174

Passage of this act resulted in commencement of the Interstate Highway System. See Fed-

eral-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 374 (1956).
175
See 70 Stat. 390 (1956).
176 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L. J. 235, 314
(2003) (discussing the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the Highway Revenue Act of 1956 and
the creation of the Highway Trust Fund).
177 See Federal Highway Administration, Primer: Highway Trust Fund, http://www.fhwa
.dot.gov/policy/primer98.pdf (1998).
178
See Dempsey, supra note 176, at 314.
179 See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 177, at 6 (providing a table of federal
highway user taxes and distribution rates under the Highway Trust Fund as of 1998); see also
Stephen McDonald, Note, Why VEETC Is Not Enough: Protecting the National Highway TransportationInfrastructure,30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 731, 739-40 (2006).
180
Federal Highway Administration, the Highway Trust Fund, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov
/reports/financingfederalaid/fund.htm#82a
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
181
For an in-depth discussion of the problems associated with this phenomenon, see Kirk,
supra note 159; see also Liam A. McCann, Note, Tea-21: Paving Over Efforts to Stem Urban
Sprawl and Reduce America's Dependence on the Automobile, 23 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 857, 862-63 (1999).
182 See Kirk supra note 159, at 2. For a scholarly observation and discussion of the apparent
inequity of Highway Trust Fund contribution and distribution ratios, see McCann, supra note 181,
at 863 (citing Robert Jay Dilger, TEA-21: TransportationPolicy, Pork Barrel Politics,and American Federalism, 28 PUBLIUS 49, 56 (1998)).
183
See Federal Highway Administration, TEA-21 - Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century, http://www.thwa.dot.govltea2I/suminves.htm (last accessed Feb. 28, 2009) (providing
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Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). 84 A state's minimum guaranteed
return is based on a calculation
that factors in the state's contributions and other
85
various considerations.'
In addition to the controversy surrounding the ratios between state contributions and returns, at least one study has suggested that the fund is grossly
under-funded and would be better served by increasing gasoline taxes. 186 Over
the years, the functional purpose and distribution of funds under the Highway
87
Trust Fund has varied, and the Fund has experienced some modification.'
However, it still provides a mechanism by which Congress raises funds for the
construction
and maintenance of highways and thereby distributes these funds to
1 88
the states.
When the Highway Trust Fund was first established under the Highway
Revenue Act of 1956189 it was set to sunset in 1972,' 9° but its lifespan has been
extended by various legislative enactments and was most recently extended to
last until 2011 by SAFETEA-LU.19'
D.

The Distributionof FederalFunds to the States

Although existing federal law provides various means by which transportation projects can be financed with federal funds, under the existing scheme,
states seeking these federal funds must often match the federal funds with pro-

an overview of the system implemented by the TEA-21's minimum guarantee on contribution
returns); see also McCann, supra note 181, at 862-63.
184
Pub. L. No. 105-178.
185
See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 183.
186
See Martin Wachs, A Dozen Reasons for Raising Gasoline Taxes, U.C. Berkeley, Inst. Of
Transp. Studies, 1, 2 (2004), available at http://ntl.bts.govllib/12000/12600/126791UCB-ITS-RR2003-1.pdf (stating that gasoline "taxes [have] failed to keep up with inflation," and that "roads
carry more goods and passengers than they did a few decades ago" and are therefore in need of
greater funding).
187
See McCann, supra note 181, at 863 (describing how Congress withheld funds gathered
under the Highway Trust Fund to help finance the Vietnam War and also noting how the nowexpired Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century provided a guarantee that revenues gathered for the Highway Trust Fund would be used for transportation and also guaranteeing that
States would receive "90.5 cents in highway funds for each dollar they contribute in fuel taxes.").
188
See Office of Legislative and Governmental Affairs, Financing Federal Aid Highways:
Authorization Act, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/fifahiwy/fifahi05.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2009) (discussing the Highway Trust Fund and formulas used to calculate revenues and revenue
distributions).
189
See 70 Stat. 390 (1956).
190
Id.; see also Federal Highway Administration, supra note 177, at 4 (indicating that "[u]nder
the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, transfer of the proceeds of the various highway user taxes to
the HTF would end after June 30, 1972, the last day of fiscal year 1972.").
191 Federal Highway Administration, supra note 180 (indicating that the Highway Trust Fund's
most recent extension under the SAFETEA-LU expanded its lifespan to at least 2011).
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portions of state and local funds. 192 Because the current statutory scheme makes
distribution of federal funds for highway construction projects contingent on a
state's ability to match the award,' 9 the reality of the situation is that a state will
only request federal funding for a project it is willing to spend its own funds on.
While requiring states to match awards of federal funds with state and local
funds for highway construction projects is an institutional norm' 94 and normally
unproblematic, this requirement presents issues when a state road crosses state
lines and when the neighboring states have different visions for the future of the
road. This is exactly the sort of problem confronting the future of Route 9. Because Virginia has made no affirmative plans to expand Route 9 and because
Loudoun County's Countywide Transportation Plan plans to maintain Route 9
"as a two-lane minor arterial highway in the Rural Policy Area,"' 195 it can be
assumed that Virginia and Loudoun County have determined, for the time being,
192

See McCann, supra note 181, at 859 (citing Talk of the Nation (NPR radio broadcast, June

10, 1998) (transcript on file with the William and Mary EnvironmentalLaw and Policy Review)
(quoting United States Representative Jim Obershaw (D-MN) as stating that in 1982 Congress
began providing States with 80% of Federal funds for construction of certain highway programs
that were not under the Interstate Highway program and requiring the States to match this allocation with 20% of funds from the State and local sources)); see also Clinton R. Snow, Comment,
Meeting Texas InfrastructureNeeds in the Face of a Burgeoning Population and Declining Tax
Revenues: The Trans-Texas Corridor,8 TEx. TECH. ADMIN. L. J. 195, 219 n.192 (stating that
under the Federal Aid Highway Act the federal government bears a specified percentage of the
cost of a highway construction project subject to the provisions of the Act which has been approved by the Secretary of Transportation, the percentage, generally, being 90% in the case of
projects affecting highways on the Interstate System, 80% in the case of projects affecting other
highways in the National Highway System, and 100% with respect to certain specified construction projects, which are generally safety-related).
193 Under existing legislation, federal funding will typically be available to finance 80% of the
costs of a project entitled to receive federal funding. See 23 U.S.C. § 120(b) (2006). Some projects can qualify for more than 80% federal funding, such as highways built on federal or Indian
lands, however, a highway project's maximum funding from federal sources will almost always
be 95%. See 23 U.S.C. § 120(a)(1) (stating that the "Federal share payable on any project in any
State shall not exceed 95 percent of the total cost of such project."). Thus states receiving federal
funding for a highway project will typically need to match the federal funding available with
anywhere from 5-20% of the project cost. On the other hand, certain federal funds apportioned or
appropriated to a state can sometimes be used by the states as part of the state's federal-fund
matching. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 120(j)(1)(A) (stating that states may receive credit toward the
non-federal matching share by contributing federal funds awarded to the state under the federal
emergency relief highway program, as codified in 23 U.S.C. § 125). Thus, there is some flexibility in acquiring and designating federal funding to be used for a highway project. For a description
of federal/state matching share requirements under SAFETEA-LU, see Federal Highway Administration, Draft RTP Federal Share and Matching Requirements under SAFETEA-LU - 12/21/05,
http://www.flwa.dot.gov/environmentlrectrails/newsldec2OO5/matchingfunds.htm
(last visited
Mar. 1, 2009).
194 See, e.g., Arthur E. Bauer, Government Reorganizationand the FederalSystem, 8 PUBLIUs
59, 60 (1978) (noting that since the inception of the Federal-Aid Highway Program, the federal
government "has required the states to participate financially, through matching formulas in the
cost of construction and to be responsible for maintaining the system.").
195 Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra note 23.
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that an expansion of Route 9 is not in the Commonwealth's best interest. Thus,
although the expansion of Route 9 could conceivably be financed with 80-95%
federal funds,' 9 Virginia would still need to finance 5-20% of the project with
its own funds.' 97 It is therefore unlikely that Virginia will voluntarily expand
Route 9 until it determines that doing so is in the Commonwealth's best interest
to do so.
In order to prevent situations similar to the Route 9 controversy from
developing in the future, statutory highway finance reform might be made to
develop a statutory scheme that promotes, encourages, and fosters increased
cooperation between states that are confronted with differing needs and interests
(e.g., Route 9). Such a scheme could make additional federal funds available
under an authorization act when two or more States jointly approve an interstate
project. Interstate cooperation in jointly approved projects could be further incentivized if such proposed legislation made additional funds available that
could not otherwise be obtained by one state acting unilaterally. Regardless of
the precise parameters involved in such reform, it is clear that fostering interstate cooperation could be accomplished by providing financial incentives that
are not available under current law.
Thus, the current controversy between the State of West Virginia and
the Commonwealth of Virginia concerning the future of Route 9 will not likely
be resolved under existing legislation. The current state of Route 9 will likely
remain stagnant, until either Virginia decides that expanding Route 9 is in its
own best interest, or until a new statutory scheme is adopted that would provide
Virginia and West Virginia with incentives to jointly agree to a solution that
best satisfies the needs and interests of each.
V. CONCLUSION

"Our Federalism,"'' 98 which calls for a division of power between the
state and federal governments, is essential to limiting the powers of each. Federalism is one of the hallmarks of the American Republic and remains a truly
great innovation of the founding fathers. However, its many benefits do not
come without consequences. This is because federalism can produce scenarios,
such as the Route 9 controversy, whereby the interests of two neighboring states
can diverge and the action (or inaction) of one places incidental burdens on the
other. Such burdens can disrupt interstate commercial harmony. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Congress is capable of directly rectifying the Route
9 controversy (and others like it). However, Congress cannot be relied upon to
come to the rescue in every instance. Congress cannot individually police the
countless other situations similar to Route 9 that likely arise throughout the na196

See 23 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).

197

Id.

198 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (Black, J).
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tion and therefore, it is essential that policies be enacted which serve to incentivize interstate cooperation and thereby prevent such situations from occurring in
the future.
Under the current federal funding system, states must request federal
funds as individual states and there appears to be little legislation that incentivizes interstate cooperation between two or more states. 99 Instead of requiring
states to request funds as individual states (by requiring them to match the distribution of federa! funds with local proportional contributions), Congress may
be able to increase interstate cooperation by incentivizing interstate cooperation
with regard to interstate highway projects. Congress could do this by making
certain funds available only to those states that agree to cooperate. This new
legislation could encourage neighboring states to jointly plan non-federal interstate highways and would thereby likely decrease instances of states developing
opposing visions.
Furthermore, it remains to be determined whether Virginia's refusal to
expand Route 9 violates the dormant Commerce Clause.2°° As discussed
above, °1 it may be possible to argue that Virginia's inaction is unconstitutional
by demonstrating that the burdens arising from the continued existence of Route
9 as a two-lane highway on the Virginia side of the border produces a constitutionally impermissible burden on interstate commerce and that this burden arises
from the state's inaction. 20 2 Even if this burden of proof could be conclusively
demonstrated through economic studies and other empirical evidence, it is unclear whether a reviewing court would be willing to grant an injunction to provide relief in light of the inherent difficulties associated with the implementation
and enforcement 2°3 of an injunction, as well as concerns for federalism and the
separation of powers.2 °4
199 Although the federal highway laws encourage the states to develop joint highway transportation plans and, in some cases, to "coordinate" with other states, there is little that sufficiently
incentivizes interstate cooperation. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C.A. § 134(f) (2009) (directing the Secretary
of Transportation to encourage state governors to take responsibility for transportation planning in
transportation areas and granting states the consent of congress to enter into compacts for the
purpose of developing joint plans in interstate areas); 23 U.S.C.A. § 135(e)(3)("each State shall

consider, at a minimum ... (3) coordination of transportation plans ... with related planning

activities being carried out outside of metropolitan planning areas and between States.").
200 In all likelihood, Virginia's inaction would be found to be perfectly constitutional.
201
See discussion supraPart HII.
203

m

See Loudoun County Planning Comm'n, supra note 23.
See discussion supraParts HI.B.2-3.

2D4

See discussion supraPart Ill.B.4.
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Regardless of whether the Route 9 controversy is ultimately resolved
through Congressional action, statutory reform, judicial decree, or through the
natural pressures of growth in the region, the controversy illustrates deficiencies
in existing federal legislation and perhaps even in the system of federalism itself. Thus, although successfully obtaining a judicial remedy might alleviate any
burdens on interstate commerce that arise from Virginia's refusal to expand
Route 9, the remedy would not likely provide a resolution for other situations
similar to the Route 9 controversy. Accordingly, Congress should move to adopt
new legislation that promotes and incentivizes increased interstate cooperation
and better inter-regional highway planning among and between the states.
Matthew Lincoln Clark*
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